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Federation and the constitution
W
hen the Australasian Federal Convention met
in the late 1890s to discuss a draft constitution
for the new Commonwealth of Australia, tax and
expenditure responsibilities of the States1 (the for-
mer colonies) were the focus of much debate.
Particular attention was given to whether the refer-
ence to customs duties should be extended to also
include excise duties since customs duties were
imposed on similar goods. The subsequent amend-
ment to s.90 of the Australian Constitution2 gave the
Commonwealth Parliament exclusive power to
impose duties of customs and excise,an action which
was to have profound and unforeseen implications
for the future taxing powers of States.
The Constitution also restricted States from levying
duties/taxes on flows to/from other States (s. 92) and
from imposing taxes on the Commonwealth (and the
Commonwealth from imposing taxes on the States)
without agreement to do so (s. 114). The Common-
wealth was also prevented from levying taxes which
discriminated between States (s. 51(ii)). In relation to
inter-governmental financial arrangements, tax shar-
ing was provided for (s. 87) along with provision for
the Commonwealth to provide grants to States on any
terms (s.96).Following a Constitutional referendum in
1928, the Commonwealth also acquired the power to
coordinate borrowing by State governments (s. 105A)
which resulted in the setting up of the Loan Council.
In the case of expenditure responsibilities, the Con-
stitution endows the Commonwealth Government
(s.51) with powers relating to defence,foreign affairs,
maritime, trade (inter- and intra- national), and pen-
sions and benefits. States, by default, retained respon-
sibility for the major expenditure areas of health,edu-
cation, transport, and law and order.
Since the Proclamation of Federation on 1 January
1901, the independence of States enshrined in the
Constitution has been progressively eroded. S. 90 of
the Constitution, which was designed to ensure
States did not impose import duties on cross-border
trade,has subsequently been interpreted by the High
Court of Australia as excluding States from levying
any form of sales tax or excise duty.
In the case of income based taxes, the colonies had
imposed such taxes as early as the 1880s and retained
these after federation. It was not until 1915 that the
Commonwealth introduced an income tax. In 1942,
the Commonwealth introduced the Uniform Income
Tax Act and forced States to repeal their own income
taxes. This was not because such State taxes were
unconstitutional but because the Commonwealth indi-
cated that any revenue raised by States from their own
income taxes would result in an equivalent reduction
in their grants from the Commonwealth. The States
challenged the right of the Commonwealth to impose
such conditions on its grants to States, but the High
Court found in favour of the Commonwealth on the
basis that s.96 of the Constitution states that the Com-
monwealth “Parliament may grant financial assistance
to any State on such terms and conditions as the Par-
liament thinks fit”.
The impact on Australian States of the loss of access
to income and consumption taxes is apparent from
Table 1. States now rely on payroll taxes for 30 per-
cent of revenue (assigned to them by the Common-
wealth in 1971), taxes on motor vehicles for 25 per-
cent and property based taxes for 19 percent. In con-
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trast, the Commonwealth receives 48 percent of its
tax revenue from taxes on personal income, 23 per-
cent from company income, 16 percent from the GST
and 16 percent from excise duties.This is all at a time
when States have retained the same expenditure
responsibilities as they had at federation. Not surpris-
ingly, the Commonwealth raises considerably more
revenue than it requires for its own-purpose outlays,
collecting 82 percent of all taxation revenue while
being responsible for only 54 percent of total general
government outlays. In contrast, the States collect
15 percent of taxation revenue and account for 40 per-
cent of total general government outlays (Table 2).A
high level of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) therefore
characterises the Australian federation.
Australia’s current approach to addressing VFI
involves two basic strategies: a system of specific
purpose (tied) payments to the States from the
Commonwealth; and a system of general revenue
(untied) grants based on GST revenue sharing.
Specific purpose payments 
Reassigning expenditure responsibilities from the
States to the Commonwealth has effectively occurred
through the use of specific pur-
pose payments (SPPs) by the
Commonwealth as shown in
Table 3. SPPs “through” States
have grown in importance in re-
cent years with the Common-
wealth assuming direct funding
responsibilities for initiatives by
States,with or without their agree-
ment. Examples include funding
for non-government schools,a first
home owner’s purchase support
scheme, and financial assistance
grants for local government.
SPPs “to”States have also been designed to fund the
expenditure obligations of States in a way which the
Commonwealth seeks to encourage.This has result-
ed in both tied and untied SPPs. This is possible
because s. 96 of the Constitution gives the Com-
monwealth the power to provide grants to States on
any terms.In the case of tied SPPs,this has had a dis-
proportionate impact on States’ fiscal autonomy
through the matching and maintenance conditions
attached to the Commonwealth grants. For example,
these tied grants provide around 15 percent of NSW
total Budget revenues,but the conditions attached to
these grants control around 30 percent of NSW bud-
get outlays.3
In the early 1980s, SPPs were some 34 percent of all
grants to States, rising to around 48 percent in the
early 1990s. As shown in Table 3, by 2005–06 SPPs
comprised some 42 percent of all State grants re-
ceived with some 21 percent of SPPs passed straight
through to the States.
GST revenue sharing
In 1998, the Commonwealth released a proposal
(Costello 1998) to introduce a 10 percent GST on 1
July 2000 and to assign the revenue to States in
return for the abolition of some nine State taxes, 4
Commonwealth Financial Assistance Grants (FAG)
and Revenue Replacement Grants (RRP).5 At the
Commonwealth level, the abolition of FAG would
help fund the repeal of a multi-rate narrow based
Table 1 
Australian tax revenue 2005–06 
Commonwealth AU$mn % All States AU$mn %
Personal Income 118,708  48.4  Payroll 13,087   29.6
Company Income 56,394  23.0  Stamp duty onprop-
erty conveyancing
3,613   8.2 
GST 38,884  15.9  Land tax    4,550   10.3
Excise & levies 22,748  9.3  Motor vehicles 10,945   24.7
Other 8,489 3.5  Gambling 5,568    12.6
Insurance 3,559  8.0 
Other 2,912   6.6 
Total 245,223 100.0 Total 44,234   100.0 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS Cat. No. 5506.0 TaxationReve-
nue, Australia, 2005-06, www.abs.gov.au
Table 2 





Tax Revenue 82.2 14.8 3.0
General Govern-
ment Expenditure 53.8 40.1 6.1
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS Cat. No.
5512.0 Government Finance Statistics, Australia,
2005–06, www.abs.gov.au
3 NSW Government Budget Papers 2006–07, Budget Paper No. 2.
p. 8–14.
4 Ibid., p 22.
5 RRP were compensation to States for their loss of taxes on petrol,
tobacco and alcohol following a successful Constitutional challenge
to their legitimacy given s. 90 of the Constitution.Wholesale Sales Tax (WST). While the Common-
wealth made much of the assignment of the GST
revenue to States, in effect, only 58.5 percent of the
GST funded their loss of FAG.6 As a consequence,
the arrangement was less genuine revenue sharing
and more an alternative to the then current system
of FAG and RRP.
While the Commonwealth proposal further reduced
the discretionary taxing revenue raising powers of
States, the States responded positively. However, in
May 1999, the Commonwealth amended its offer to
the States as a result of needing to compromise to
ensure the GST reforms passed through the
Parliament.This involved excluding basic foods from
the base of the proposed GST, funded in part
through delays to the funding of State tax reforms.
To remove any concern on the part of the States that
they might be worse off during the transition period,
the Commonwealth agreed that each State would
receive a Guaranteed Minimum Amount (GMA)
such that if any State was worse off, they would
receive Budget Balancing Assistance (BBA) to
make up the shortfall.7 On 30 June 1999, the
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Reform of
Commonwealth-State Financial Relations (IGA)
was signed by the Commonwealth and the States
and on 1 July 2000, the 10 percent GST was intro-
duced.
While some State taxes were abolished within a year
of introducing the GST, the States agreed to review
the remainder by 2005 with a view to their possible
abolition, conditional on the GST revenue sharing
arrangement providing the necessary funding. By
2005,all States had either repealed these taxes or set
dates for their repeal or further review.8 The
Commonwealth has continued to argue that since all
States are consistently better off (GST>GMA) they
should embark on State tax reforms additional to
those identified in IGA.
For States,the repeal of the various State taxes noted
under the IGA has directly impacted on their discre-
tionary sources of tax revenue (and VFI). In
2005–06, States collected 14.8 percent of all tax rev-
enue, down from 19.5 percent in 1998–99 and over
the same period,tax revenue as a proportion of total
State general government operating revenue fell
from 39 percent to 31 percent.Over the same period,
the contribution to total State general government
operating revenue by general revenue grants
increased from 35 percent in 1998–99 (FAG) to
45 percent in 2005–06 (GST revenue).
Grant distribution consultative framework
The institutional framework for determining the
grant distribution to States is outlined in Figure 1.
Central to the process is the Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) which is the peak intergov-
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Table 3 
State government, operating statement – general government 2005–06, in %
NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS ACT NT All
Taxation revenue 36 34 25 32 26 20 29 13 31
GST revenue grant toStates 23 24 25 23 30 41 27 61 26
S P P s  t o  t h e S t a t e s 1 41 41 31 51 41 41 01 21 4
S P P s t h r o u g h  t h e S t a t e s 555455525
Other revenue 21 22 32 25 24 20 29 13 24
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Taxation revenue 36 25 17 127221 1 0 0
G S T  r e v e n u e  g r a n t  t o S t a t e s 2 8 2 1 2 1 1 09425 1 0 0
S P P s  t o  t h e S t a t e s 3 2 2 2 2 0 1 28312 1 0 0
S P P s t h r o u g h  t h e S t a t e s 3 2 2 5 2 0 1 08221 1 0 0
O t h e r  r e v e n u e 2 7 2 1 2 8 1 28221 1 0 0
T o t a l 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 18322 1 0 0
Population 33 25 20 108221 1 0 0
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, 2006–07 Budget Paper No. 3, www.budget.gov.au; Australian Bureau of Statistics,
ABS Cat No. 5512.0 Government Finance Statistics, 2005–06,Table 19, www.abs.gov.au
6 See Commonwealth of Australia, 2007–08 Budget Paper No. 3,
Table B2.
7 For a discussion of how GMA works in practice, see Common-
wealth of Australia, 2007–08 Budget Paper No. 3, Table B2:
<www.budget.gov.au> 8 See Collins and Warren(2007),Table 1.CESifo DICE Report 1/2008 13
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ernmental forum in Australia and involves the
Prime Minister, each State’s Premier and a repre-
sentative from local government. Consultation and
cooperation between the Commonwealth Govern-
ment and States in specific policy areas is facilitated
by over 30 Commonwealth-State Ministerial Coun-
cils under COAG. Both Ministerial Councils and
COAG can initiate, develop and monitor the imple-
mentation of policy reforms of national significance
requiring cooperative action. When formal agree-
ment is needed, this is embodied in an intergovern-
mental agreement.
One such instance is the Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Reform of Commonwealth-State
Financial Relations (IGA), which resulted in the
establishment from 1 July 1999 of the Ministerial
Council for Commonwealth-State Financial Re-
lations9 (the “Treasurers’ Conference”).Its functions
include oversight of IGA and its regular review;
oversight of the operation of the GST; discussion on
the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) rec-
ommendations on relativities prior to the Com-
monwealth Treasurer making a determination; and
making recommendations to the Commonwealth
Treasurer on GMA.
Grant distribution methodology 
Critical to the allocation of s. 96
grants amongst States is the
advice provided by the Com-
monwealth Grants Commission
(CGC) to the Commonwealth
Treasurer on their allocation.The
CGC’s terms of reference require
it to redress any horizontal fiscal
imbalance by developing per
capita relativities which provide
all States with the same fiscal
capacity to provide services to
their populations if they make the
Australian average effort to raise
revenue and operate at the aver-
age level of efficiency.
The objective of horizontal fiscal
equalisation (HFE) in Australia
is therefore focused on compen-
sating disadvantaged States for their expenditure dis-
abilities (due to their relatively high per capita costs
for providing public services) and revenue disabilities
(having relatively small per capita tax bases).No con-
sideration is given to inefficiencies arising from their
own discretionary policies. Rather than performance
equalisation, the focus is on equalising per capita
capacity equalisation in a way that does not force the
adoption of uniform policies across States. In assess-
ing that capacity, the CGC treats all Specific Purpose
Payments (SPP) from the Commonwealth to States as
simply another revenue source (unless the CGC is
directed to quarantine these grants – which is more
the exception than the rule10).
The precise methodology applied by the CGC in
preparing State relativities (Wi) is outlined in Figure 2
along with how it is applied to derive each State’s
share of the grant pool. In practice, this pool includes
both the revenue from the GST and the total of all
(unquarantined) Health Care Grants (HCG) allocat-
ed under the Health Care Agreement between the
Commonwealth Government and each State. The
resulting distribution of the GST/HCG pool detailed
in Table 4 provides all States with the same fiscal
capacity to provide services to their populations, if
they make the Australian average effort to raise rev-
enue and operate at the average level of efficiency.11
Consultative Framework
Council of Australian Governments 
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9 For a description of COAG, see
www.coag.gov.au/ministerial_councils.htm
10 “Quarantined” SPPs are a small proportion of total SPPs and
have historically related to direct grants to non-government
schools and local governments.
11 For the 2007 CGC report to the Commonwealth on relativities,
see<www.cgc.gov.au/state_finances_inquiries/2007_update_report2/>The future
With the introduction of the GST in 2000 and the
repeal of various State taxes, the proportion of State
revenue subject to the HFE process increased 100
percent (between 1998–99 and 2005–06).This is at a
time when State tax revenue
rose by only 25 percent.
Unsurprisingly, past concerns
with the HFE methodology are
now the focus of considerably
greater attention with two issues
in the forefront.Firstly,there has
been a long standing concern
that the emphasis on ensuring an
equitable distribution of the
grant pool between States has
come at too high a price in terms
of economic inefficiencies.While
the CGC asserts that its ap-
proach is State policy neutral, in
practice this is not the case.
States’ policies directly influence
the CGC estimates of national
averages (as shown in Figure 2).
In the case of taxes, this can
mean that a State’s effort to
grow its tax base (and economy)
with rate or base changes can
result in a transfer of these ben-
efits to mendicant States. This
can act as a disincentive to a
State implementing efficiency
improving reforms.
The second area of concern has been the compre-
hensiveness of the Australian approach.The current
approach is sophisticated in that some 40 categories
of State expenditure are identified (which with many
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Figure 2
Applying HFE Principles in Australia 
All State Average Budget
Result (Deficit)  per capita
where State Budget Result is GST
grant plus HCG plus SPP plus own-
source revenue less expenses
Assessed Expenditure in State i
Sum of all standardised per capita
expenditure
For each State expenditure 
category







unique disability factors of State
eg scale, dispersion, inputs costs
etc.
= 
standardised expenditure per 
capita (unique to each State)
For each State revenue
catetory






relative size of the revenue base
per capita of State
= 
standardised revenue per capita
(unique to each State)
Assessed Revenue in State i
Sum of all standardised per capita
revenue
Unquarantined SPPs in State i
(included as they are available to
fund standard expenditure) 
Total requirement for financial










of State i (Wi) 
Grant to State i
(with populationPopi) 
Gi = Wi * Popi *  Grant Pool
Wi * Popi
Source:Base on AttachmentB,CGC Report on State Revenue Sharing Relativities, 2007 Update, p. 70,
www.ege.gov.au
Definitions:
Relative size of the revenue
base per capita of State =
Ration ofwhat a State would 
raise per capita, if it applied
Australian average tax rates
to its tax bases, relative to
the national average per
capita.
(Note: State Tax Effort is the 
ratio ofwhat a State raises in
taxes to what it could raise if
it applied Australian aver-
age tax rates to its revenue
bases)
HCG = Health Care Grant 







Source:Base on AttachmentB,CGC Report on State Revenue Sharing Relativities, 2007 Update, p. 70,
www.ege.gov.au
Source: Attachment B, 2007 CGC Report on State Revenue Sharing Relativities, 2007 Update, p. 70.
Table 4 
Distribution of the GST/HCG "pool" and the effect of horizontal fiscal equalisation in 2006–07






























mn mn AU$mn AU$ per head
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NSW 6.864 0.873 5.994 13,821 2,787 11,034 –293 –366
VIC 5.128 0.896 4.593 10,591 2,018 8,573 –242 –282
QLD 4.090 1.024 4.188 9,656 1,607 8,049 54 171
WA 2.073 1.005 2.083 4,804 826 3,978 10 52
SA 1.562 1.189 1.856 4,280 689 3,591 434 565
TAS 0.490 1.549 0.760 1,752 179 1,573 1,266 1,553
ACT 0.331 1.146 0.379 874 106 768 335 –209
NT 0.208 4.328 0.902 2,079 94 1,985 7,672 7,546
Total 20.746 20.754 47,856 8,304 39,552 0 0
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, 2007-08 Budget Paper No. 3, Table 1, Table 10, www.budget.gov.au, Australian
Bureauof Statistics, ABS Cat. No. 5220.0 AustralianNational Accounts: State Accounts, 2006–07, www.abs.gov.auCESifo DICE Report 1/2008 15
Forum
factors applied to each results in some 359 expense
factor assessments) and 37 State tax bases. However,
there is doubt about whether all this sophistication
achieves a superior equalisation outcome (Warren
2006, 82).A related concern is the CGC’s inclusion of
HCGs and SPPs in its analysis.This is despite the level
and initial distribution of HCGs and SPPs being
determined in direct discussions between individual
States and the Commonwealth.In effect,the action of
the CGC in subtracting SPPs from a State’s total
requirement for financial assistance when allocating a
grant pool that includes both GST and HCGs usurps
the intent of the direct Commonwealth-State discus-
sions on the level and distribution of these payments.
While there have been numerous calls for change to
the current HFE methodology, at no stage have
these proposals recommended the abandonment of
HFE principles in the allocation of grants between
States in Australia. What is at issue is the precise
methodology applied and its comprehensiveness.
Reforms proposed include:
1. Quarantining some or all SPPs and HCGs from
the HFE methodology.
2. Reducing the reliance on a complex array of both
tax and expenditure variables when applying
HFE principles.
3. Removing some taxes from HFE consideration to
provide an incentive for States to rely more heav-
ily on such taxes.
4. Benchmarking “standard” revenue (in Figure 2)
to less than 100 percent of the actual average per
capita revenue.
5. Distributing less than 100 percent of the general
revenue grants through the equalisation pool.
While change will no doubt come slowly to the insti-
tutional framework designed to address VFI in
Australia, there is growing acceptance that some
change is inevitable in order to address the adverse
efficiency impact of the past emphasis on equity in
the distribution of grants amongst the Australian
States.
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